Certificate of Need (CON) Laws
Summary: 32 US states require government approval before opening or expanding hospitals, allowing incumbent hospitals to block competitors.
The Problem
Certificate of Need laws require anyone wanting to open or expand a healthcare facility to prove to a state board that there is a "community need" for the service.
Result: Incumbent hospitals can legally block competition by arguing there's no need.
How It Works
Application Process
- Entrepreneur wants to open new hospital or add beds/services
- Must submit application to state CON board
- Existing hospitals can object and provide testimony
- Board decides if "need" exists
- Process takes 6-18 months, costs $50k-500k
- If denied, cannot proceed
Who Sits on CON Boards?
Often includes representatives from existing healthcare providers → conflict of interest.
States with CON Laws (2024)
32 states still have some form of CON: - Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
18 states repealed or never had CON: - Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wyoming
Historical Origin
1970s: Federal government encouraged states to adopt CON laws - Goal: Control healthcare costs by preventing "overbedding" - Theory: More hospital beds → more usage → higher costs
1986: Federal mandate repealed (evidence showed it didn't work) - Many states kept laws anyway - Incumbent hospitals lobby to maintain them
Evidence of Impact
Studies show:
- ✅ CON laws increase costs by 5-15%
- ✅ CON laws reduce competition
- ✅ CON laws do not improve quality
- ✅ States without CON have more hospitals per capita, lower prices
Mechanism:
- Protects existing hospitals from competition
- Allows them to maintain high prices
- Reduces innovation and new entry
- Particularly blocks specialty hospitals
Real-World Examples
Blocked Competitors
- Heart hospitals trying to compete with large systems → blocked for "duplication of services"
- Ambulatory surgery centers → blocked to protect hospital OR revenue
- Imaging centers → blocked in some states
Delays and Costs
- Even when approved, process adds $50k-500k and 6-18 months
- Creates uncertainty that deters investment
- Lawyers and consultants required to navigate process
International Comparison
Most developed countries DO NOT have CON-type laws: - ❌ UK: No CON (public system, government decides capacity) - ❌ Germany: No CON (regulated prices, competition on quality) - ❌ France: No CON (public system) - ❌ Switzerland: No CON (private but regulated) - ❌ Canada: No CON (public system, provincial planning)
US is unique in using CON laws to restrict private competition.
Why Do They Persist?
Political Economy:
- Incumbent hospitals lobby hard to keep them
- Frame as "preventing wasteful duplication"
- Claim quality concerns
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Fund political campaigns
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Concentrated benefits, diffuse costs
- Hospitals gain millions from reduced competition
-
Patients lose but don't notice it's due to CON
-
Regulatory capture
- CON boards often staffed by industry insiders
- Regulators sympathetic to incumbent arguments
Counter-Arguments (Hospital Industry Claims)
Claim 1: "Prevents overbuilding and waste"
Reality: Studies show CON increases costs, doesn't reduce utilization. Market discipline works better.
Claim 2: "Ensures rural access"
Reality: CON doesn't require service to rural areas. Rural hospitals close at similar rates in CON vs non-CON states.
Claim 3: "Maintains quality through oversight"
Reality: Quality is already regulated through licensing, accreditation, Medicare certification. CON adds no quality benefit.
Claim 4: "Prevents cherry-picking profitable patients"
Reality: EMTALA already requires ERs to treat all. CON is about protecting hospital revenue, not patient access.
Consequences
CON laws directly contribute to: - Hospital monopoly power - reduces competitive threat - Entry barriers - explicit legal prohibition - High prices - protects incumbents from disruption
Repeal Efforts
States that repealed:
- Indiana (1999): Prices did not increase, access improved
- Pennsylvania (1996): More competition, no negative effects
- New Hampshire: Recent repeal, early data positive
Reform attempts:
- Some states narrowed CON scope (fewer services covered)
- Others streamlined approval process
- Ongoing legislative battles in many states
What Would Happen If Repealed Nationally?
Expected effects: - ✅ More specialty hospitals and surgery centers - ✅ Increased competition in urban areas - ✅ Lower prices for elective procedures (5-15% reduction) - ✅ More innovation in care delivery - ⚠️ May not help rural areas (fundamental economics, not just regulation)
Would not solve: - Emergency care pricing (still geographic captivity) - Labor costs (fundamental shortage) - Insurer incentive problems
But would remove one major barrier to competition.
Political Feasibility
Moderate-High at state level: - Some states have successfully repealed - Bipartisan appeal (free market + lower costs) - Strong opposition from hospital lobby
Low at federal level: - Healthcare regulation is state-level - No current federal CON mandate to repeal - Would need state-by-state campaigns
Parent Causes
- 1970s misguided cost-control policy
- Regulatory capture by incumbent hospitals
- Political lobbying by healthcare industry
Related Facts
- 1.1.4 - Contracting Leverage - CON makes this worse
- 1.3.3 - EMTALA - Another barrier, but less removable
- 1.8 - Nash Equilibrium - CON helps lock in high-cost system